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　　In this paper I examine some early Chan uses of technical terms 
derived from Buddhist pramān
4
a (methods of analysis to establish valid 
cognition) and Yogācāra schemes of practice. I take passages from the 
Lidai fabao ji (Record of the Dharma Treasure Through the Generations) 
to discuss the rhetorical implications of selected quotations and 
references. As I have argued elsewhere, the Lidai fabao ji is a good 
representative of developments in early Chan, because it survives only 
in Dunhuang manuscripts and fragments and does not appear to have 
undergone extensive editing after its probable composition in the late 
8th century. The second part of the text is framed as a series of Dharma 
talks given by Chan Master Wuzhu (714-774). In accounts of his debates 
with other masters Wuzhu is sometimes shown using Sanskrit-based 
technical terms to demonstrate the superiority of the Chan approach. 
Here I present the dialogues in which such terms appear and discuss 
the issues embedded within these deployments of scholastic 
epistemology in a subitist context.
　　I have been motivated to revisit issues in the Lidai fabao ji because 
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they have a certain contemporary currency for those who are trying to 
defend Buddhist commentarial and sectarian debate as having 
soteriological and even phenomenological significance. In mainstream 
Buddhist academics, we often see reduction of Yogācāra to antiquated 
scholasticism and Chan to sectarian in-fighting and elite word-games. 
These forms of anti-phenomenological reductionism, whether 
intentionally or not, support the drive to represent context-independent 
meditation practices as compatible with naturalist paradigms and 
accessible to various forms of scientific investigation. By actively 
debunking or implicitly undermining the possibility that historical 
Buddhist debates are relevant to living practices and experiences, 
aspects of practice and experience not accessible to mainstream clinical 
study protocols are marginalized.
　In any case, though I here acknowledge this underlying motivation, it 
is not explicitly pursued in what follows. The paper section-topics are:
I. Dilun pramān
4
a anchored in path-schemes
II. Extraliterary discourse and Kuiji’s 窺基 (632-682) use of pramān
4
a
III.  Use of pramān
4
a terminology in the Ding shifei lun and the Lidai fabao 
ji
IV. Responding to Wuzhu’s critics with reference to the Qixin lun




a anchored in path-schemes
　　This section is a summary and discussion of Lin Chen-kuo’s 林鎮國 
excavation of the path taxonomies in two Dunhuang manuscripts, S. 
4303 and S. 613, from his article “Buddhist Epistemology in Sixth 
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Century China.” 1  The two texts have been identified as doctrinal 
compendia composed by monks of the Dilun 地論 (Stages Treatise) 
school. Lin characterizes them as the earliest “Chinese indigenous 
writings on pre-Dignāga epistemology.” 2  He thus challenges the 
standard assumption that Chinese reception of Indic pramān
4
a began 
with Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (ca. 602-664) reformed Yogācāra, the so-called 
Weishi 唯識 (Consciousness Only) movement.3 Lin’s analysis of these 
Dunhuang texts highlights a heretofore under-appreciated Sinitic 
integration of pramān
4
a and tathāgatagarbha (buddha-matrix theory) in 
Dilun paths of practice. 
　　Lin argues that Dilun interest in pramān
4
a, methods for establishing 
valid cognition, has to be understood in the context of delineating stages 
in the path of cultivation. To borrow a phrase from another of his 
articles, this is a “phenomenology of awakening,” 4  of cognitive change. It 
is not a phenomenology that seeks to establish stable structures of 
subjective perception. 
　　S. 4303 (Guang siliang yi 廣四量義, Elaboration on the Meaning of 
Four Means of Valid Cognition) provides a Dilun-inflected reading of a 
standard set of four pramān
4
a: 
1) perception (xianliang 現量)
2) inference (biliang 比量)
3) testimony (xinyanliang 信言量)
4) teaching (jiaoliang 教量)
　　The work of each type corresponds with sequential stages in the 
path of practice, and they are also seen as cognitive functions that 
characterize both path and attainment. Thus direct perception is a 
means from the beginning of the path and characterizes the perception 
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of a buddha. Lin calls this a “process of cognitive development” viewed 
from the perspective of enlightenment. Moreover, these epistemological 
stages correlated with phenomenological shifts in cognition are discussed 
in terms that show the influence of Chinese tathāgatagarbha thought.5 
Lin argues that the Dilun scholars formulated a unique “indigenous” 
ontology to complement their soteriology, one that contrasts with 
Xuanzang’s later orthodox Yogācāra contextualization of pramān
4
a.6
　　The taxonomy in S. 4303 is structured in terms of “mind” (subject of 
cognition, xin 心) and “dharma” (object of cognition, fa 法), understood as 
dynamically corresponding functions, each shifting in relation to the 
other as the capacity to approach nondual knowledge deepens. Lin 
summarizes: 
In accordance with the dynamic interrelationship between mind and 
its object, “dharma” is understood as the object of intentionality in 
the phenomenological sense, instead of as the existence independent 
of mind. . . . Conversely, the capacity of mind is also dependent on 
the features of the object. For instance, when the teaching of 
practice is taken as the object of contemplation, the various 
characteristics of teaching will also shape the state of mind.7
　　As the scaffolding of a system that Lin designates as a 
“phenomenological ontology,” S. 4303 lays out a four-part categorization 
of the object of cognition that is not found in Indic sources: name (ming 
名); characteristic (xiang 相); function (yong 用); and substance (ti 體). 
These are taken as the objects of the pramān
4
a or mind-work of teaching, 
testimony, inference, and perception (and this last may be dual or 
nondual). In other words, the aspects are co-relational with the modes of 
apprehension. One might add that the correspondence of “name” and 
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teaching makes sense in terms of the co-emergence of language and 
Dharma in intrinsic liberative response to conditions (upāya).
　　A related three-part characterization of the three bodies of the 
buddha is found in another part of S. 4303: substance = dharmakāya/
tathatā (absolute); characteristic = sam
4
bhogakāya (reward, bliss); and 
function = nirmān
4
akāya (transformations, teaching). Notably, S. 4303 and 
S. 613 were probably composed around the same time as the Dasheng 
qixin lun 大乘起信論 (Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the 
Mahāyāna, ca. mid-6th century; hereafter Qixin lun).8 As is well-known, 
it also uses a tripartite taxonomy of substance, characteristic, and 
function.
　　Lin elaborates on the path-orientation of the correspondence 
between pramān
4
ic practice and objective counterparts: 
The above objects of cognition are arranged in the order according 
to the progressive path of cultivation. That is to say, when one first 
undertakes the practice, one begins at the stage of belief (xin 信) to 
learn the teachings that are transmitted in words. Once one has 
learned the teachings, one enters into the stage of understanding (jie 
解 ), the second stage of cultivation, and one comprehends the 




a) of object. In the third stage, i.e., 
the stage of practice (xing 行), one comes to know the Function (yong 
用) of the Principle (li 理 = tathatā) through inference. In the final 
stage of cultivation, i.e., the stage of experiential witness (zheng 證), 
one is capable of intuitive awareness of the Substance (ti 體), which 
is also identical to the Truth, i.e., tathatā. . . . “Name” is taken as the 
object of belief, being cognized through the teaching at the first 
stage; “Characteristics” is taken as the object of understanding, being 
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known through testimony at the second stage; “Function” is taken as 
the object of practice, being known through inference at the third 
stage; and “Substance” is taken as the object of experiential witness, 
being known through immediate perception at the final stage.9
　　Lin argues that the Dilun schema share a key feature with 
Abhidharma taxonomies of grades of objects (dharmas): they can only 
be understood as co-respondents with levels of meditative attainment. In 
other words, objects neither exist “in the mind” nor as fixed forms. Lin 
notes similarities in this regard between S. 4303 and a Dunhuang 
manuscript known as the “Map of the Dharmadhātu” (Fajie tu 法界圖).10 
While the schema may vary, they each illustrate a kind of soteriological 
uncertainty principle: cognitive modes and manifested states are co-
constituting. As Jingying Huiyuan 淨影慧遠 (523-592) puts it in his 
Dasheng yizhang 大乘義章 (Chapters on the Meaning of the Mahāyāna): 
“The locations that other buddhas manifest are indeterminate in their 
conditions (buding jinggu 不定境故). It is all like this: if there is a body [of 
a certain nature] there follows a land [of a certain nature].”11
　　For Dilun exegetes, a progressive path grounded in pramān
4
a was 
complemented by an approach that Lin calls “holistic” but could also be 
called subitist (sudden): they integrated tathāgatagarbha focus on the 
emptiness of intrinsic nature and “non-obstructive dependent arising” 
(yuanqi wuai 緣起無礙). Different kinds and levels of pramān
4
ic work and 
correspondent cognitive modes are resolved into their shared 
interpenetrating lack of intrinsic nature. This clearly anticipates later 
developments in Chinese Huayan and Chan.12
　　Lin illuminates another innovation in the Dilun Dunhuang texts 
through discussion of analytic structures based on cause and fruition, or 
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yuanzhao 緣照 (dualistic illumination) and tizhao 體照 (self-illumination). 
These also correspond to gradual and subitist perspectives. From the 
perspective of cause, realization of truth by using dualizing discursive 
means progresses through stages of cultivation. However, this is at the 
same time the “self-realization” (tizhen 體證) of Dharmakāya/
tathāgatagarbha as the nature or substance (ti 體) of all beings. 
　　Lin emphasizes the unique turn taken in these texts: the attribution 
of a causal function for suchness or truth (tathatā). 
At this jointure, we have to pay special attention to the idea of 
Truth (tathatā) as Substance (ti) which is capable of Function (yong). 
According to the Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, Truth (tathatā) is 




ta), which also means to 
be unable to causally function by producing effects. However, in S. 
4303 it clearly claims that Truth (tathatā) itself appears to causally 
function (ziti xianyong 自體顯用). This theoretic move exemplifies 
Sinitic thinking, as such a thought is not attested in Indian Buddhism. 
More significantly, this move forecasts the whole story of Sinitic 
Buddhism in the scenario of the Awakening of Faith, which is 
believed to have been composed during the very same period as S. 
613 and S. 4303.13
　　Lin avers that deployment of the dichotomous rubric of yuanzhao 
and tizhao runs throughout Dilun literature of the late sixth century, 
and he cites a Yogācāra-inflected example from Huiyuan’s Dasheng 
yizhang. He further interprets Huiyuan’s use of this rubric in his 
commentary on the Awakening of Faith as a form of “Absolute Idealism,” 
or the self-awareness of truth, synonymous with true mind, dharmakāya, 
and tathāgatagarbha as the self-illuminating “transcendental/ontological” 
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ground of beings.14
　　While the implied Hegelian parallels are clear, Lin also expresses 
ambivalence about whether to interpret Dilun use of tizhao simply (and 
conventionally) as nonconceptual cognition, or to treat the S. 4303 
statement that substance manifests as function (asserting the causal 
existence and agency of tathatā) as a unique Dilun axiom. He inclines 
toward the latter, concluding: “By these expositions we conclude that 
the cognition of Truth is achieved through the self-cognition of Truth. 
Truth is the self-illumination of Truth itself, while Truth is not 
differentiated from the Mind.”15
　　Lin insightfully brings out unique features of Dilun thought and 
practice that were later refashioned in Chan and other Chinese Buddhist 
modes. However, I feel that his “Absolute Idealism” label may do an 
injustice to the complex dynamic integration that the Dilun exegetes 
seem to have been attempting. Unlike Hegel’s claims for the intrinsic 
rationality of Spirit, in the texts Lin describes, the means of valid 
knowledge served as ordering principles for provisional path-structures. 
Pramān
4
a was a foundational upāya, but it was not claimed to be the 
intrinsic function or salient ontological characteristic of “Mind” writ 
large. Rather, the causal function of self-illuminating “substance” 
remained emptiness, cognizance of lack of dualism “in itself.”  
　　Moreover, the pragmatic function of pramān
4
a that is emphasized in 
the conclusion of S. 4303 is providing criteria for correctly assessing the 
experiences claimed by other practitioners as well one’s own. Correlation 
of pramān
4
a, cognitive modes, and the teachings helped to mitigate 
inevitable subjective shaping of the process of cultivation through 
intermediary meditative states. As Lin notes, “These questions concern 
most religious practitioners, now and then, because, as we know very 
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well, religious scandals of inauthentic ‘enlightenment’ often occur.”16
　　Lin concludes by summarizing two unique features of Dilun use of 
pramān
4
a. First, there is no indication of Dilun interest in use of pramān
4
a 
in doctrinal debates. Their concern was to correlate epistemology and 
modes of cognitive experience on the path to buddhahood that they 
were pursuing. Second, epistemology and tathāgatagarbha were 
integrated in a subitist vision of self-illumination as the function of 
dharmakāya.17 Lin’s characterization of Dilun epistemology thus serves 
to show its relevance for later developments in Chan and Huayan. 




　　In this section I discuss Katsura Shōryū’s succinct and illuminating 
article, “The Theory of Apoha in Kuiji’s Cheng weishi lun Shuji.” 
Katsura demonstrates connections between the theory of apoha 
(exclusion/negation) in Dignāga’s (ca. 480-530) reformation of pramān
4
a, 
and Xuanzang’s disciple Kuiji’s 窺基 (632-682) use of it in his Cheng 
weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記 (Commentary on the Discourse on the 
Theory of Consciousness Only). Katsura argues that the lack of an 
available textual source for Kuiji’s discussion points to the likelihood that 
Xuanzang lectured on Dignāga’s theories. For our purposes, this is 
significant because it would be a kind of “footprint in the snow,” the 
trace of a contextual evanescent extraliterary culture through which 
Dilun and Weishi discourse might have contributed to new trends like 
Huayan and Chan. In the next sections of this paper, I take up Shenhui’s 
attempt to deploy pramān
4
ic xianliang and biliang in a relativistic fashion, 
a move that could have stemmed from evolving discourse communities 
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rather than any formal transmission or study of epistemological texts. 
　　Katsura first demonstrates Dignāga’s integration of Indian traditions 
of debate and epistemology through a comparison of his earlier and later 
work. Dignāga’s signature innovation in his later Pramān
4
asamuccaya 
with autocommentary18 was his designation of perception (pratyaks
4
a, 
xianliang) and inference (anumāna, biliang) as the only two methods of 
establishing valid cognition. Previously considered a pramān
4
a in its own 
right, the authority of scriptural and verbal testimony became a 
subsidiary type of inference.19 
　　The focus of Katsura’s interest is Dignāga’s theory of apoha 
(exclusion/negation) in the fifth chapter of the Pramān
4
asamuccaya. This 
theory does important work to unite the various dualistic means of valid 
cognition by emphasizing their shared relativistic, other-dependent 
functioning. Apoha is the work of establishing provisionally stable 
knowledge through “ . . . ‘exclusion/negation of others’ (anyāpoha/
anyavyāvr
4
tti), which is in fact a feature common to both inference and 
verbal testimony, as well as to conceptual cognitions (vikalpa 分 別) in 
general. In other words, verbal testimony and the other pramān
4
as are 
included under the category of inference because they all share the 
same function of ‘excluding others’.”20
　　Katsura reveals that due to the lack of an extant Chinese 
Pramān
4
asamuccaya he had assumed apoha was unknown to medieval 
Chinese Buddhist scholars; however, on investigating some suggestions 
from other sources, he discovered traces of Dignāga’s theory in Kuiji’s 
work. He argues this shows that “Xuanzang, though he did not translate 
PS & PSV into Chinese, must have discussed some of Dignāga’s 
important theories, including his apoha theory, during his lectures, in 
order for Kuiji to have been able to utilize that theory in his explications 
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of his master’s work.”21
　　Apoha designates an approach to linguistic reference, and thereby 
inference, that highlights any referent’s dependence on exclusion of 
others -- any “this” is mentally constructed in relation to “not-that.” In 
contrast to his predecessors, Dignāga proposed that any property of the 
“universal” (jātidharma), rather than pertaining to a real existent, 
designates the general characteristic of an imaginary existent derived 
through exclusion of other imaginary existents. Direct perception 
(xianliang) cognizes the unique particular, while the general or universal 
is cognized through inference (biliang). Dignāga holds that all linguistic/
conceptual cognition functions in this discriminatory fashion, generalizing 
“this” in relation to “not something else.”22
　　Katsura reviews passages in Kuiji’s Cheng weishi lun shuji that 
show knowledge of Dignāga’s theory. He concludes with a summary 
indicating both appropriation and modification of apoha epistemology:
1 ) Kuiji knows that there are two means of valid cognition (liang 量), 
viz., perception (xianliang 現量) and inference (biliang 比量); and that 
the former takes the particular characteristic (zixiang 自相) as its 
object, while the latter takes the general characteristic (gongxiang 共
相).
2 ) Kuiji defines the general characteristic as “exclusion of others” 
(zheyu 遮餘), and both inference and verbal cognition take the 
general characteristic as their object by “excluding others”. 
Therefore, the exclusion of others is the general nature and function 
of conceptual cognition, including both inference and verbal 
cognition.
3 ) The particular characteristic of an object, or the object itself, is 
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beyond the reach of conceptual cognition. Thus, it cannot be 
expressed by any verbal designation (yanshuo 言説). Only the 
general characteristic can be expressed verbally.
4 ) However, ultimately speaking, even the general characteristic 
cannot be expressed by any verbal designation. This idea might not 
have been endorsed by Dignāga and other Indian Buddhist logicians. 
. . .
5 ) Kuiji seems to understand the distinction between the particular 
and the universal as relative to one another, just as in the hierarchy 
of the Vaiśes
4
ika categories. This understanding again might not have 
been endorsed by Dignāga, because for him, only the universal 
characteristics are relative to each other and constitute a hierarchy. 
In any case, it is important that Kuiji refers to the hierarchical 
construction of Buddhist dharmas when he discusses verbal and 
conceptual cognition.23
　　Katsura’s summary of Kuiji’s work provides a bird’s-eye view of a 
particular discourse in a unique context, where Xuanzang served as 
mediator and mentor for interpretation of texts and debates from 
another world. Tracking the impact and trajectories of Xuanzang’s 
students is beyond the scope of my study. However, I find this one 
elegant example provocative, in light of key practice approaches in early 
Chan. 
　　Focus on “exclusion of others” is one means of recognizing that all 
objects/meanings are products of subliminal dichotomizing processes, 
which is the “discriminatory consciousness” (fenbie 分別 or xinyi 心意) 
that Wuzhu and other early Chan proponents exhort their listeners to 
see through, directly. Translated into a pramān
4
a idiom, this would be to 
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jianxing 見性 (see the nature) in the manner of xianliang.24 In the Lidai 
fabao ji, Wuzhu regularly praises wunian, which is nothing if not “direct 
perception,” as transcending or collapsing all defining/exclusionary 
opposites. Thus we find in the Lidai fabao ji many apophatic conflations 
of mutual exclusions, like “not produced, not extinguished.” 
　　This is of course a key feature of the prajñāpāramitā discourse that 
all these trajectories share. Yet like the Dilun use of pramān
4
a as a path-
scheme, apoha and wunian emerge from particular performative and 
soteriological contexts - grounded attempts to capture in the act and 
thus make a vanishing act of discriminatory vijñaptimātra. The Chan 
focus on “non-production” (busheng 不生) that we will track in the next 
sections is another manifestation of the never-ending potential to not-do 
and not-appropriate the inferentially constructed imaginary universals 
(reifications) that minds continually produce. 
III.  Use of pramān
4
a terminology in the Ding shifei lun 
and the Lidai fabao ji
　A. Shenhui’s Rhetoric
　　Shenhui is famous for denouncing “Northern School” practice as 
dualistic and pointless striving to purify oneself of adventitious 
defilements. To convey this message, Shenhui drew from and simplified 
Yogācāra, Tiantai, and tathāgatagarbha doctrines. He claimed that so-
called “purity Chan” was counterproductive insofar as it focussed 
attention on the distinction between wisdom and delusion, and this 
distinction was itself the only delusion. His charge that Shenxiu and his 
heirs advocated such a notion of practice has been effectively 
challenged.25 
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　　Shenhui’s tenets of sudden awakening and realization of Buddha-
nature were not new, but he set these rubrics in a context of imminent 
crisis, in which both the historical fate of the Dharma and the personal 
awakening of the listener were implicated. Scapegoating the Northern 
School helped fuel a sense of urgency. In Shenhui’s writings and records 
of his sermons and debates, we see doctrinal arguments blended with ad 
hominem attacks. Shenhui’s combative rhetoric set off a kind of “cultural 
revolution” in Buddhist soteriology. Bernard Faure called this the 
“rhetoric of immediacy,”26 while John McRae described the effect as a 
scramble to avoid dualistic formulations under an implicit “rule of 
rhetorical purity.”27
　　These rhetorical maneuvers structured an increasingly complex 
game of “doing things with words” in Chan works, where every 
encounter was a chance to play Vimalakīrti. Probing the deeper 
ramifications of this orthodoxy, Faure explored the complicated effects 
of the denial or inversion of conventional means that attended the ascent 
of the “rhetoric of immediacy.” His deconstruction of the paradoxes of 
this rhetoric is founded on the recognition that the distinctive Chan 
idiom depends on the denial of intermediate stages and all mediating 
functions of practice. 
　　In other words, Chan rhetoric of immediately accessible realization 
of intrinsic buddha-nature attempts to preclude provisional truth and 
gradual practice, including all path-schemes. Faure argued that this 
resulted in various forms of the “return of the repressed” in which the 
Chan master, rather than Buddhas and bodhisattvas, became the focus 
of sometimes bizarre forms of devotion, representation, and propitiation. 
He maintained that the rhetoric of immediacy was a further extension of 
the utopian denial of hierarchy and multiplicity already intrinsic to 
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Buddhist discourse.28
　B. The Lidai fabao ji 歷代法寶記
　　The Lidai fabao ji was one of the first works after Shenhui’s own to 
deploy this rhetoric in the service of sectarianism. The Lidai fabao ji 
was compiled in Sichuan in ca. 780 by disciples of the Bao Tang 保唐 
school founder Wuzhu 無住 (714-774). Wuzhu’s antinomian sermons 
deflate conventional practices through acerbic criticisms and constant 
recourse to apophatic expressions. Wuzhu’s rhetoric repeatedly evokes 
the immediacy of no-thought. Yet he also recognizes the suffering 
connected with mundane states of mind and recommends the practice 
of meditation as a provisional means, something that the rhetoric of 
immediacy would eventually purge. Significantly, Wuzhu offers himself 
as a refuge. 
　　At the same time, the Lidai fabao ji authors created an historical 
background for Wuzhu’s teachings that reveals their concerns about the 
contradictions inherent in the collapse of mediating paths into the 
immediacy of buddha-nature. They attempt to make Shenhui speak for 
the dilemma created by his own rhetoric: why and how does one preach 
a truth that is intrinsic to each member of the audience? In later Chan 
literature, nearly every Chan master must prove his mettle by sporting 
with this paradox (why did Bodhidharma come from the West?), but in 
the late eighth century it was still relatively fresh. 
　　The Lidai fabao ji authors’ portrayal of Shenhui is ambivalent. The 
Shenhui section opens with a description of his popular sermons, and 
Shenhui is made to speak his ultimate truth in Two Truths terms. On 
the one hand he speaks of “realizing for oneself,” but the Lidai fabao ji 
authors also make him take responsibility for the other hand, teaching 
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followers how to do it. In their account, Shenhui opens up an immanent 
and ambiguous space for the mediations of moral discipline and 
meditation, as well as endorsing verbal expression of the sudden:  
The Venerable Shenhui of Heze monastery in the Eastern Capital 
[Luoyang] would set up an [ordination] platform every month and 
expound on the Dharma for people, knocking down “Purity Chan” 
and upholding “Tathāgata Chan.” He upheld direct experience and 
verbal explanation -- regarding precepts, meditation, and wisdom, he 
did not knock down verbal explanation. He said, “Just as I am 
speaking now is none other than śila (moral discipline), just as I am 
speaking now is none other than samādhi (meditation), just as I am 
speaking now is none other than prajñā (wisdom).” He expounded the 
Dharma of no-thought and upheld seeing the nature.29
　　This statement justifies the act of speaking for non-duality, at least 
for the Chan master, and it does echo the teachings in Shenhui’s Tanyu 
壇語 (Platform Address).30 However, the Lidai fabao ji authors frequently 
set up other masters for a fall, and subsequent passages show Shenhui 
at a disadvantage. Shenhui is made to yield the figurative high seat of 
the Southern School to Wuzhu, saying, “There is yet someone who will 
explain it [fully], I really cannot presume to explain it.”31 The Lidai fabao 
ji authors create a platform for this endorsement of Wuzhu by taking a 
dialogue attributed to Shenhui from its original context and significantly 
reshaping it. We turn now to the text from which the passage was 
extracted.
　C. The Ding shifei lun 定是非論
　　The most famous scene of Shenhui’s 神會 (684-758) campaign against 
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the “Northern School” was the wuzhe dahui 無遮大會 (unrestricted great 
assembly) of 732 at the Dayun 大雲 monastery in Huatai 滑臺. As 
recorded by his disciple Dugu Pei 獨孤沛, the work entitled Putidamou 
nanzong ding shifei lun 菩提達摩南宗定是非論 (Treatise Determining the 
True and False about the Southern School of Bodhidharma; hereafter 
Ding shifei lun) purports to contain Shenhui’s answers to questioners at 
Huatai and on previous occasions.32
　　The passage used by the Lidai fabao ji authors features a famous 
dialogue between Shenhui and his interrogator Dharma Master 
Chongyuan 崇遠. Shenhui’s assertion that he is a tenth-stage bodhisattva 
is challenged by Master Chongyuan. Chongyuan says that if Shenhui is 
what he claims, he should be able to manifest innumerable bodies in 
innumerable buddha-realms, so he should be able to manifest some 
divine transformations (shenbian 神變) for the audience. 
　　Shenhui then quotes the Nirvān
4
a Sūtra to claim that his own case is 
like that of Cunda, the humble lay donor who fed the Buddha his last 
meal: the Buddha is said to have recognized Cunda’s mind as identical to 
his own, while Cunda’s body remained ordinary.33 Pushing his advantage, 
Shenhui asks Chongyuan if he perceives buddha-nature (jian foxing 見佛
性), and Chongyuan says no. Shenhui then says he should not be 
explicating the Nirvān
4
a Sūtra, as perceiving buddha-nature is the 
prerequisite. Chongyuan asks if Shenhui perceives it, and of course 
Shenhui says yes. Chongyuan then asks:
　　“Do you perceive it inferentially (biliang 比量), or do you 
perceive it directly (xianliang 現量)?”
　　The Venerable answered, “I perceive it inferentially.” 
　　[The Dharma Master] challenged him, “What is comparison (bi 
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比), and what is estimation (liang 量)?” 
　　The Venerable answered, “That which is called ‘comparison’ is 
comparison to Cunda. That which is called ‘estimation’ is equivalence 
to Cunda.” 
　　Dharma Master Chongyuan said, “Do you definitely perceive it?” 
　　The Venerable answered, “I definitely perceive it.” 
　　Dharma Master Chongyuan asked, “What do you do to perceive 
it?” 
　　The Venerable answered, “I don’t do anything (wu zuo wu sheng 
無作勿生).” 
　　Dharma Master Chongyuan fell silent and did not speak. The 
Venerable saw that the other was silent, did not understand what he 
had said, and was not going to ask anything more.34
　　This passage employs a familiar commentarial gesture, breaking 
down compounds into their components to interpret them. However, in 
terms of the pramān
4
a distinctions that this dialogue evokes, the 
interpretation is unstable. First Shenhui claims that he is like Cunda, 
with a mind identical to a buddha but the body of an ordinary person.35 
However, he then claims to perceive buddha-nature by inference, which 
would imply a mediated and intermediate process, unlike the direct 
perception of a buddha. Yet in response to Chongyuan’s question about 
method, Shenhui again takes the subitist high-ground and claims he is 
not engaging in any particular process -- thus implying a buddha’s 
nondual perception, not inference.
　　Shenhui’s jump away from pramān
4
a to the Nirvān
4
a Sūtra’s Cunda 
as a source of support has a certain historical poignancy. Though 
beyond the scope of the present paper to delineate, the focus on direct 
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perception that we have been tracking stems from a turning point, 
comparable to the Chan revolution, that took a different direction in 
India. When Dignāga developed his methods of epistemological analysis 
of inference and perception and devalued scriptural hermeneutics, this 
was in part to reduce dependence on the sūtras as sources of authority. 
The use of logical analysis of mental processes to distinguish valid 
cognition from delusion deploys a kind of phenomenological immediacy.36 
The shift from scriptural hermeneutics to epistemology was avowed to 
be liberative, but then the commentarial tradition became in turn a dead 
weight of dead letters for its Chan critics. Ironically, Dignāga’s would-be 
heirs became scapegoats in early Chan denunciations of exegetical 
delusions of grandeur. Instead, early Chan radicals turned to scriptures 
for support, albeit mostly Mahāyāna and apocryphal ones.   
　D. Back to the Lidai fabao ji
　　Let us turn now to the Lidai fabao ji refashioning of the Ding shifei 
lun dialogue about Cunda, where Shenhui is cast in a much more 
diffident role:
　　[Master Yuan] further asked, “In what way do you perceive 
[buddha-nature], is it by the eyes that you perceive, or by the ears or 
the nose, etc., that you perceive?” 
　　[Master] Hui replied, “Perceiving is not so quantifiable, 
perceiving is simply perceiving.” 
　　[Master Yuan] asked, “Do you perceive the same as Cunda, or 
not?” 
　　[Master] Hui replied, “I perceive by inference (biliang jian 比量
見). Comparison (bi 比) means ‘comparable to Cunda,’ estimation/
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knowing (liang 量) is ‘equivalent to Cunda.’ I dare not make a final 
conclusion.”37
　　In this passage Shenhui also evokes the ambiguity between 
inference and direct perception, but here it becomes an expression of 
doubt rather than nondual certainty. While in the Ding shifei lun 
Shenhui is shown baffling Chongyuan with his profundity and quick 
responses, in the Lidai fabao ji Shenhui submits to an interrogation, 
declines to make a definitive statement about his own realization, and 
then gives a prophetic endorsement of Wuzhu’s inheritance of the true 
Dharma and the robe of transmission. In this scene, Shenhui is made to 
repeat three times that he does not have Huineng’s robe; this is clearly 
the main point for the Lidai fabao ji authors. There is no need to belabor 
the sectarian motives at work, but this does not mean that more subtle 
soteriological issues were absent. 
　　Though later Chan would firmly identify itself as the “special 
transmission outside the scriptures,” in the Lidai fabao ji there is still a 
discernible unclosed gap between commentarial expertise and subitist 
manifest immediacy (and destiny) as the source of authority.38 To further 
illustrate the Lidai fabao ji’s battle with the authority of commentarial 
expertise, let us look at a different passage, where it is Wuzhu rather 
than Shenhui who is challenged by monks deploying epistemology-based 
challenges about the manner of perception. As in the Ding shifei lun 
dialogue, “not doing,” in the sense of not engaging in a particular 
technique, becomes the crucial issue.
Then there were the Masters Yijing 義浄, Zhumo 處黙, and Tangwen 
唐蘊, who were all disciples of Chan Master Huiming 恵明.39 They 
came wishing to stay with the Venerable. 
‒ 255 ‒
　　The Venerable asked, “Ācārya, what scriptures and treatises 
have you explicated?” 
　　Master Tangwen replied, “I have explicated the Baifa lun 百法
論 (Treatise on One Hundred Dharmas),40 I have lectured on it for 
the monks.” 
　　The Venerable invited him to expound on it. Tangwen replied, 




ta (wuwei 无為, the 





為, conditionality); altogether they encompass all dharmas.” 
　　The Venerable quoted the Lan
4
kā-sūtra, saying: “‘Those without 









ta.’41 ‘Those who practice must not give rise to distinctions.’42 
‘Scripture after scripture expounds delusory concepts, in the end 
none depart from [mere] designations. If you transcend verbal 
explanation then there is nothing to explain.’”43
　　Tangwen said to Master Yijing, “Please, Ācārya, you ask next.” 
So Yijing asked the Venerable, “Chan Master, how do you do/
produce (zuomei sheng 作沒生)44 seated meditation?” 
　　The Venerable replied, “Not-doing/producing (busheng 不生), this 
is ‘Chan.’” 
　　Yijing didn’t understand it himself, so he asked Zhumo, “What 
does this mean?” Zhumo didn’t understand either. Instead he told 
Master Yijing to ask something else. 
　　The Venerable knew they didn’t understand, and so he asked 
Yijing, “Ācārya, what scriptures and treatises have you explicated?” 
　　He replied, “I have explicated the Pusa jie 菩薩戒 (Bodhisattva 
Precepts),45 I have lectured on it for the monks.” 
　　The Venerable asked, “What is the substance of the precepts, 
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and what is their meaning?” Yijing had no words with which to 
reply, and then he burst out with invective: “It is not that I don’t 
understand, it was only in order to test you. Your sort of ‘Chan’ -- I 
despise [such] ‘not practicing’!” 
　　Zhumo chimed in: “I despise your dull ‘not doing,’ I despise 
[your] stupefying ‘not practicing,’ I despise [your] lazy ‘not doing,’ I 
despise [your] slovenly ‘not entering!’”46 
　　Moral gongfu is a familiar motif in traditional Chinese biography and 
fiction, but this portrayal of petty authority overbalancing itself is 
especially damning because the question of conduct and the fruits of 
study and practice are at the heart of the encounter. The monks’ 
inabil ity to contain themselves shows them to be unworthy 
representatives of the Vinaya, let alone the dharmakāya. In response, 
Wuzhu chastises the monks: “You Ācārya shave off your hair and put 
on robes and say to yourselves, ‘I am the Buddha’s disciple,’ but you are 
unwilling to learn the śraman
4
a Dharma. You just say, ‘slovenly doing, 
lazy doing, I despise dull not-entering.’ This is not the śraman
4
a lion, this 
is a kind of wild dog.”47 
　　We saw in the alleged confrontation between Shenhui and 
Chongyuan that Shenhui laid claim to practicing/direct perception as 
“not doing anything” (無作勿生). Similarly, in this passage Wuzhu 
exposes the difference between reifying a practice-method (作沒生) and 
the Chan practice of not producing or activating (不生) any distinction 
between practice and perception.
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IV.  Responding to Wuzhu’s critics with reference to 
the Qixin lun
　　The passage above was a staged response to clerical unease over 
Chan’s increasingly successful usurpation of established modes of 
authority, with its antinomian and anti-scholiast rhetoric. Famously, both 
Wuzhu and his putative master, the Korean master Wuxiang 無相 (684-
762), were criticized for rejecting the precepts. However, the case is a 
little more complicated than “rejection.” 
　　One of Wuzhu’s signature teachings was “at the time of true no-
thought, no-thought itself is not,”48 and his teaching on the precepts was 
that they are completely realized in the practice of true no-thought: 
“When deluded thoughts are not produced, then one turns away from 
dust and adheres to awakening, and this is precisely ‘fulfilling the 
Vinaya precepts.’ When thoughts are not produced, this is precisely 
Vinayottara; when thoughts are not produced, this is precisely 
Vinayaviniścaya. When thoughts are not produced, this is precisely 
destroying all mind-consciousnesses.”49
　　The distinction Wuzhu makes is taken from the Jueding pini jing 決
定毘尼經 (Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipr
4
cchā-sūtra, Sūtra of the Inquiry of 
Upāli Regarding Determination of the Vinaya).50 Vinayaviniścaya refers 
to expedient application of Vinaya to remove transgressions, and 
Vinayottara refers to the ultimate view of Vinaya, the true fundamental 
purity of all dharmas. In keeping with emerging Chan subitist ideology, 
Wuzhu’s teachings were focused on the ultimate lack of any actual 
psychosophic closure,51 rather than “rejecting” the karmic work 
(precepts) involved in unclosure. 
　　This is arguably the same kind of antidotal upāya of “inversion” that 
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we see advocated in the Nirvān
4
a Sūtra and other tathagāthagarbha texts: 
reification is the problem, and clinging to notions of a pure consciousness 
is as obstructive as any other unreflective dualism. This was also 
Xuanzang’s caution in his Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (Discourse on the 
Theory of Consciousness Only): “But so as to oppose false attachments 
to the view that external to citta and caittas there are perceptual-objects 
(ching 境, vis
4
aya) [composed of] real, substantial entities (shih yu ching 實
有境), we say that the only existent is consciousness (shuo wei yu shih 
說唯有識). But if you become attached to the view that vijñapti-mātra is 
something truly real and existent, that’s the same as being attached to 
external perceptual-objects . . . .”52
　　Examination of the controversy over Bao Tang practice reveals a 
similar antidotal inversion that was misconstrued by contemporaries. 
Guifeng Zongmi 圭峰宗密 (780-841) criticized Bao Tang practice as 
nihilistic “extinguishing consciousness” (mieshi 滅識), perhaps influenced 
by Shenqing’s 神清 (d. 814) criticism of Bao Tang practice as 
“extinguishing of mind” (xinmie 心滅).53 However, careful perusal of the 
Lidai fabao ji shows that in Wuzhu’s use of related phrases, “mind” and 
“producing thoughts” means the mind of the sense-consciousnesses and 
their appropriative cycles. His point is in line with vijñaptimātra: if there 
is no discriminative grasping of phenomena as such, or indeed of 
vijñaptimātra itself, then karmic burden is nonexistent and not-
experienced (i.e. Vinayottara).
　　In their critiques of the Bao Tang approach, both Shenqing and 
Zongmi focussed on Bao Tang abandonment of recognized forms of 
practice as a form of anti-practice, and therefore as grasping and 
conditioned (youwei 有為). This is understandable -- Wuzhu’s teaching 
that one should not depend on forms was pointedly instantiated in the 
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Bao Tang disciples “not-doing” the standard forms of monastic practice, 
including reciting the precepts. However, Wuzhu’s lectures attempt to 
embed this abandonment of formal practice in the nonduality of wunian: 
in doing/not-doing, neither doing nor not-doing, and both doing and not-
doing. 
　　The Lidai fabao ji does use a phrase that seems to provide support 
for accusations of nihilism: pohuai yiqie xinshi 破壞一切心識 (destroying 
all mind-consciousnesses). It is used in Wuzhu’s assertions about the 
Vinaya quoted above, and also as a subtitle for the Lidai fabao ji itself.54 
The notion of xinmie also appears in a quotation repeatedly used in the 
Lidai fabao ji, taken from the Qixin lun: 心生即種種法生，心滅即種種法
滅 “As mind is produced so the various dharmas are produced, as mind 
is extinguished so the various dharmas are extinguished.”55
　　It is worth looking at the Qixin lun context, as this passage proved 
to be lastingly influential. A Sinitic creation, the Qixin lun was a widely 
implemented source for quasi-Yogācāra and tathāgatagarbha technical 
terms and concepts that are difficult to map consistently across the 
various translations of canonical Indian texts. One of the Qixin lun’s 
main claims to fame was its concept of a dual-aspect ālayavijñāna. Based 
on the Trim
4
śikā, ālayavijñāna is usually understood as the storehouse 
consciousness (8th), manas is understood as the continuing subject-object 
reifying consciousness (7th), and mano-vijñāna is the mind-sense 
consciousness (6th) that automatically arises in appropriation of its 
conceptual objects. However, the Qixin lun correlates the true-reality 
aspect of ālaya with tathāgatagarbha. It introduces the concept of ālaya 
by discussing its two aspects, not simply the defining it as the seedbed 
of transformations that give rise to experience of sam
4
sāra. The ālaya is 
explained as the pivotal matrix of both sam
4
sāric transformations of 
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consciousness and tathāgatagarbha.56 
　　This the Qixin lun source for the line quoted by Wuzhu, claiming 
mind to be the origins of its own delusory self-grasping. As the passage 
explains, it is the tri-functional “mind” of citta (xin 心, the sam
4
sāric aspect 
of the ālaya), manas (yi 意, self-awareness), and mano-vijñāna (yishi 意識, 
the mind-sense consciousness) that is “destroyed.” In other words, an 
interlocking epistemological habit is eliminated, there is no ontological 
basis or ultimate ground that could be eliminated.  
Therefore the Triple-World is sham and of mind-only (weixin 唯心) 
made; apart from mind, then, there are no six sensory perceptual 
fields. What does this mean? As all dharmas arise from mind and 
delusions are thereby produced, all discriminating is none other than 
discriminating one’s own mind. Mind does not perceive mind, it is 
without apprehensible characteristics. One ought to know that the 
world’s perceptual fields are maintained on the basis of the nescience 
and deluded minds of beings. Therefore all dharmas are like images 
in a mirror without substance that can be apprehended; they are 
mind-only and [thus] false. As mind is produced so the various 
dharmas are produced; as mind is extinguished (xinmie 心滅) so the 
various dharmas are extinguished.57
　　This, then, is the background for Wuzhu’s use of xinmie. The Qixin 
lun serves as a kind of tracer of Yogācāra-tathāgatagarbha thought from 
the sixth-century world of prolific theorization to the late eighth-century 
world of emerging Chan subitist orthodoxy, with its policing of rhetorical 
purity and its nondual “not-doing.” In the course of this trajectory, study 
and practice of the more intricate and technical Yogācāra analyses of 
vijñaptimātra fell away. Provisional and ultimate aspects of perception 
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both folded imperceptibly into wunian. 
V. Direct Perception in a dialogue in the Lidai fabao ji
　　Notably, a Lidai fabao ji passage featuring Wuzhu’s dialogue with 
his patron, the imperial general Du Hongjian 杜鴻漸 (709-769), centers on 
the manner in which the enlightened mind perceives phenomena. Du 
questions Wuzhu as to how he perceives a tree in front of the courtyard 
and hears a crow calling.58 The doctrinal issue at stake had been raised 
in Shenhui’s Tanyu: “One who experiences no-thought is still fully 
seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing; but this unceasing emptiness 
and tranquility is precisely the practice of śila, samādhi, and prajñā.”59 
　　While Shenhui taught the practical point that no-thought does not 
mean trying to shut down the normal personality factors of sensation, 
perception, and conceptualization, Wuzhu’s responses to Du Hongjian 
seem rather dualistic. First he claims the power of supramundane vision, 
and then asserts that mundane and ultimate seeing should be 
distinguished. Ironically, Du Hongjian’s responses are more in accord 
with later Chan than Wuzhu’s. He appears to play with Wuzhu, giving 
him the opportunity to claim supramundane seeing and then turning the 
tables on him by asking about mundane seeing. Wuzhu’s retreat to the 
ultimate level and his use of a series of scriptural quotations would not 
have been considered impressive in the context of the later gongan 
cases, but he earnestly avoids advocating either “ordinary mind” or 
“extinguishing mind”: 
The Venerable replied, “This seeing, hearing, perceiving, and 
knowing [that you are getting at] is worldly seeing, hearing, 
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perceiving, and knowing. The Vimalakīrti-sūtra says, ‘If you go about 
seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing, then this is seeing, hearing, 
perceiving, and knowing. The Dharma transcends seeing, hearing, 
perceiving, and knowing.’60 No-thought is thus no-seeing, no-thought 
is thus no-knowing. It is because beings have thought that one 
provisionally teaches no-thought, but at the time of true no-thought, 
no-thought itself is not.” He went on to quote the Vajrasamādhi-sūtra, 
“The Most Honored Greatly Enlightened One expounded the 
Dharma of producing no-thought (sheng wunian 生无念). [Regarding] 
the mind of no-thought and non-production (wunian wusheng xin 无
念无生心), the mind is always produced and never extinguished.”61
　　Wuzhu’s (or the Lidai fabao ji authors’) dependence on scriptural 
quotations may be one reason why the dialogue appears so differently in 
later versions in the Jingde chuandeng lu 景 德 傳 燈 錄 (Record of the 
Transmission of the Lamp [compiled in] the Jingde era)62 and in the Fozu 
lidai tongzai 佛祖歷代通栽 (Comprehensive Register of the Buddhas and 
Patriarchs through the Ages).63 In these versions Du Hongjian is 
reduced to a mere foil for Wuzhu’s discourse, and the discourse is closer 
to Song dynasty notions of classic Chan teaching. The Jingde chuandeng 
lu version (upon which the Fozu lidai tongzai account is based) is as 
follows: 
Just then a crow called from the tree in the courtyard. The lord (Du 
Hongjian) asked, “Do you, master, hear it or not?” [Wuzhu] said, “I 
hear it.” The crow left, and the lord asked again, “Do you hear it or 
not?” [Wuzhu] said, “I hear it.” The lord said, “The crow is gone and 
there is no sound, how can you say that you hear it?” The master 
then addressed the assembly, “A Buddha in the world is difficult to 
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meet and the true Dharma is difficult to hear. With each and every 
truth you listen to, hearing is without hearing and does not impede 
the nature of hearing. Originally it is not produced, does it ever 
happen that it is extinguished? When there is sound it is the 
defilement of sound produced of itself. When there is no sound it is 
the defilement of sound extinguished of itself. But this hearing-nature 
does not follow sound’s production and does not follow sound’s 
extinction. If you awaken to this hearing-nature then you escape the 
karmic transmission of the defilement of sound. Then you know that 
hearing is without production or extinction, hearing is without going 
or coming.”64
　　This dialogue comprises the bulk of the notice on Wuzhu in both 
later sources. Thus, the question of whether or not Wuzhu advocated 
“extinguishing consciousness” seems to have continued to reverberate in 
these distant echoes of his teachings. The Jingde chuandeng lu passage 
reflects (and refines) aspects of Wuzhu’s teachings as found in the Lidai 
fabao ji. Though the Jingde chuandeng lu compiler Daoyuan 道原 does 
not quote directly from the text, it seems he had access to some version 
of the Lidai fabao ji that contained more than just the Du Hongjian 
encounter. Significantly, Daoyuan does not appear to endorse Shenqing’s 
or Zongmi’s negative assessment of Wuzhu’s teachings. He conveys 
Wuzhu’s repeated subitist assertions that the fundamental nature of the 
mind/senses cannot be extinguished or defiled, and apparent karmic 
entanglement disappears with this realization.  
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VI. Conclusion
　　The Dilun Dunhuang texts and the Qixin lun are creative 
representatives of Sinitic attempts to capture and reformulate key 
aspects of pramān
4
a, tathagathāgarbha, and Yogācāra texts. By the time a 
Chan “rhetoric of immediacy” began to assert itself, Chinese Buddhists 
had had several centuries to delve into many of these texts and produce 
their own voluminous commentaries. A key question animating all this 
effort may still be relevant in some circles: is unmediated direct 
perception the “true nature” of the illusory “psychosophic closure” of 
subjective inferential processes?
　　In Shenhui’s records and in the Lidai fabao ji, we are able to see 
work-in-progress to craft new methods of pointing to nondual direct 
perception. To be honest, their rhetoric often seems rather awkward 
and unnecessarily pugnacious. It is easy to scapegoat the self-serving 
nature of their polemical “dialogues.” However, that should not deter us 
from recognizing the importance of this awkward struggle, then as now. 
　　The pivoting discourse necessitated by the rules of nondual rhetoric 
was necessarily relativist and dynamic, such that there was always the 
danger of reification of its antinomianism and iconoclasm. Subsequent 
Chan masters developed elegant literary techniques to try to keep 
indeterminism in play. While an ethics of sudden awakening as a basis 
for gradual cultivation became more or less institutionalized, challenge 
and interrogation were also assiduously cultivated. Through it all, the 
direct perception of a buddha remained a stable gold-standard, even 
though kicking away its scaffolding became a signature Chan practice. 
　　Chan-style pramān
4
a is its rhetorical insistence that xinyanliang 信言
量 (testimony) and jiaoliang 教量 (teaching) are im-mediately actualized 
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in ordinary/nondual perception (xianliang 現量). In the Lidai fabao ji, 
Wuzhu emphasizes that this is both “lively like a fish jumping” (huo popo 
活鱍鱍)65 and unborn (busheng 不生). Here we see the birth of the 
signature claim that Chan is both the way mind is and the mind of the 
Way, ordinary/buddha. The challenge is still alive and kicking, is it not?
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36 I recognize that this claim is considered problematic, an issue that I 
address in my Practicescapes and the Buddhists of Baoshan (2020).




*尒 許 多 is colloquial, meaning an indeterminate number; Yanagida 
1976: 161.
*只没 is a colloquial compound with the same meaning as 只, “only.” 
Yanagida 1976: 161. 
*It was necessary to add these two characters in order to replicate 
the meaning of the Putidamo nanzong ding shifei lun passage.
38 “Destiny” here is a reference to the ways the early Chan texts (like the 
Platform Sūtra and the Lidai fabao ji) used the trope of a disciple destined 
to meet his master and receive the special transmission. On the one hand 
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the “immediacy” of buddha-nature is on display, and Huineng and Wuzhu 
are both portrayed as instantly getting the point. But the stories of their 
connections with Hongren and Wuxiang, respectively, are also told in a 
way that suggests karmic connection, or even the indigenous Chinese 
notion of fate in the sense of Heaven’s mandate (天命) -- as John Jorgensen 
(2005) pointed out in his book on Huineng. 
39 These disciples are otherwise unknown. Their master is possibly Fochuan 
Huiming 佛川慧明 (697-780), for whom there remains an inscription, Tang 
Huzhou Fochuan si gu Dashi taming 唐湖州佛川寺故大師塔銘 (Stūpa 
Inscription for the Former Great Master of Fochuan Monastery in 
Huzhou, Tang dynasty), Quan Tang wen (917), and a biography in the 
Song gaoseng zhuan, T. 2061, 50: 876a23-c5. In the former it is said that he 
was a co-disciple of Yongjia Xuanjue 永嘉玄覺 and Shenhui, and in the 
latter it is said that he had three disciples, Huijie 慧解, Huimin 慧敏, and 
Ruzhi 如知. Fochuan monastery is in the northern part of Huzhou 
(Zhejiang province, Wuxing 吳興 district). Yanagida 1976: 237.
40 The Treatise on One Hundred Dharmas refers to Xuanzang’s translation 
of the Dasheng baifa mingmen lun 大乘百法明門論 (Mahāyānaśatadharma 
prakāśamukha-śāstra), T. 1614, 31. This is an abbreviation based on 
Vasubandhu’s division of all dharmas into five classes of one hundred 
dharmas in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, T. 1579, 30. Many people were 
lecturing on the Baifa lun at that time, one frequently sees it mentioned 
in monks’ biographies; Yanagida 1976: 237. Wuzhu depreciates it again in 
Section 37, T. 2075, 51: 194c16-17.
41 From the Lan4 kā-sūtra, T. 672, 16: 631c23; also in the Zhujing yaochao, T. 
2819, 85: 1197a6-7.
42 From the Lan4 kā-sūtra, T. 672, 16: 631a7.
43 From the four-fascicle Lan4 kā-sūtra, T. 670, 16: 505b8-9.
44 Zuomei sheng 作没生: 没 is used colloquially in Dunhuang texts in the way 
that me 麼 would later be used. Zhimei 只没 in the next line is thus 
equivalent to zheme 這麼; see Jiang [1959] 1988: 515. The Taishō version 
has zuo wu sheng 作勿生, the same colloquial phrase that is used in the 
Ding shifei lun to question Shenhui’s mode of perception.
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45 It is possible that the Pusa jie meant here is Zhiyi’s commentary on the 
Fanwang jing, the Pusa jie jing shu 菩薩戒經疏, T. 1811, 40; Yanagida 1976: 
238.












* 禅 added interlinearly.
* 知 added interlinearly.
* 闍梨 added interlinearly.
* 嫌 added interlinearly. 嬾嫌 should be reversed to 嫌嬾, as in the 
previous verb-object examples.
* 慵嫌 should be reversed to 嫌慵, as above.
47 Adamek, trans., 2007: 372; Lidai fabao ji, T. 2075, 51: 191a20-22.
48 Zheng wunian zhi shi, wunian bu zi 正無念之時無念不自. 
49 Adamek, trans., 2007: 392-394.
50 Trans. ascribed to Dharmaraks
4
a 竺 法 護 (ca. 265-313), but possibly early 
5th cent. T. 325, 12.
51 This is Dan Lusthaus’s useful gloss for vijñaptimātra, pointing to the 
mutually conditioning loop between consciousnesses and their sense-
spheres as a form of cognitive closure that has no corresponding 
independent reality. (Lusthaus 2002: 35-36). “Closure” refers to imputation 
of independent externality to things, imputation that is only supported by 
constant cognitive self-referencing gestures or loops of intentional 
appropriation. These closed loops karmically shape perception, because 
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one perceives in the manner in which one has habituated oneself through 
the self-perpetuating processes of appropriation.
52 Lusthaus, trans., 2002: 465.
53 Adamek 2007: 224, 280.
54 T. 2075, 51: 194b13; used in the subtitle as 破壞一切心, T. 2075, 51: 179a4. 
See Adamek 2007: 280-281, 300, 393.
55 Qixin lun, T. 1666, 32: 577b22–23. Quotations in the Lidai fabao ji occur at 
T. 2075, 51: 189c15, 193b15, and 194b24; see Adamek 2007: 281, 365, 387, 
394.
56 T. 1666, 32: 575b8-11.





58 This of course brings to mind the famous “tree in the courtyard” line by 
Zhaozhou 趙 州 in Case no. 37 of the Wumenguan (Mumonkan) 無 門 關; 
Hirata, ed. 1973: 133.
59 Nanyang heshang dunjiao jietuo chanmen zhiliao xing tanyu, Hu Shi, ed., 
[1958] 1970: 241.
60 Loosely based on the Vimalakīrti-sūtra, T. 475, 14 : 546a23-24.
61 Adamek, trans., 2007: 358 & 361; Lidai fabao ji, T. 2075, 51: 189a27-b3. 






* Gang written with 罡 instead of 岡 on the left.
62 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. 2076, 51: 220c14-23.
63 Jingde chuandeng lu, T. 2076, 51: 234b10-235a7. The Fozu lidai tongzai 
version of 1341 closely follows the Jingde chuandeng lu; see T. 2036, 49: 
600b9-601a3.
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65 See T. 2075, 51: 190c21; 191c11-12; 194c14; 195a27-28. 
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